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ABSTRACT
This article discusses municipal self-government in Japan by focusing on tax receipts 
of local budgets. Revenues and expenditures of local governments of unitary states, 
such as Japan, roughly corresponds to subnational budgets of federal states. In uni-
tary frameworks, however, local authorities enjoy greater autonomy. In Japan, local 
governments account for a large share of public spending and tax revenues. Tax re-
venues are decentralised and taxes play a significant role in consolidated budget re-
ceipts. The centralised system of local administration and finance that evolved in late 
nineteenth-century Japan was based on arrangements prevailing in Germany at that 
time. In the second half of the twentieth century, the system of inter-governmental 
fiscal relations was rebuilt according to the Anglo-Saxon decentralised model, result-
ing in more autonomy (including tax administration) given to local authorities. The 
current version of the local public finance in Japan has several salient characteristics 
and combines both centralisation and decentralisation features. The tax base for the 
key prefectural and municipal taxes overlaps the tax base for the national income 
and consumption taxes. The main source of municipal revenue is the property tax. 
Financial equalisation is achieved through grants, essentially in the form of the lo-
cal allocation tax (LAT), which is a percentage of national taxes that is channelled 
to prefectural and municipal budgets. Another important feature of local finance is 
that municipal governments cover a comparatively large share of expenditures by is-
suing local bonds. The reform of local governance and inter-governmental fiscal rela-
tions conducted in the early 2000s increased the financial autonomy and tax receipts 
of municipalities. The reform’s results were positively received by the international 
community and may be interesting for several transitional and developing economies 
that are seeking to improve their system of local finance.
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Целью данной статьи является характеристика организации местного само-
управления и формирования доходной части местных бюджетов в Японии. До-
ходы и расходы местных бюджетов унитарных государств, включая Японию, 
примерно соответствуют субнациональным бюджетам федеративных стран, 
в то время как полномочия органов самоуправления в унитарных образова-
ниях обычно шире. Для местных бюджетов Японии характерны высокая доля 
осуществляемых расходов и налоговых доходов, децентрализация налоговых 
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поступлений и существенная роль налогов в совокупных бюджетных поступле-
ниях. Система местных финансов Японии сформировалась в конце XIХ в. по 
прусскому образцу и носила централизованный характер. Со второй половины 
ХХ в. местные органы власти получили существенную автономию, в том числе 
налоговую. Построение системы межбюджетных отношений происходило по 
рекомендациям, ориентированным на англо-саксонскую децентрализованную 
модель местных финансов. В настоящее время японский вариант организации 
местных бюджетов имеет несколько специфических черт, к которым относится, 
прежде всего, параллельное сосуществование централизации и децентрализа-
ции. Кроме того, налоговая база по ключевым налогам префектур и муници-
палитетов пересекается с национальными налогами на доходы и потребление. 
Основу доходной базы муниципалитетов составляет налог на имущество. Вырав-
нивание бюджетной обеспеченности производится путем зачисления в бюджеты 
префектур и муниципалитетов местного распределительного налога, который 
представляет собой трансферт из поступлений по национальным налогам. Важ-
ной особенностью местных финансов Японии является сравнительно высокая 
доля расходов, финансируемая за счет муниципальных облигаций. И наконец, 
в начале 2000-х гг. в Японии была проведена реформа местного самоуправле-
ния и межбюджетных отношений, которая привела к повышению финансовой 
самостоятельности и налоговой обеспеченности муниципальных образований. 
Результаты реформы получили высокую оценку международного сообщества 
и с этой точки зрения могут представлять интерес для всех стран, занимающихся 
укреплением финансовых основ деятельности местных органов власти.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
местные бюджеты, местные финансы, местные налоги, налоговые доходы мест-
ных бюджетов, Япония, префектуры, муниципалитеты, разделение налогов
1. Introduction
The division of expenditures and reve-
nues between the central and local govern-
ments in countries depends on a variety of 
historical, economic, and political factors. 
Analysis of the advantages and drawbacks 
of national budgeting provides valuable in-
sight into the inner design of fiscal systems 
and enables recommendations regarding 
the best practices for possible endorsement. 
Description of national local finance usu-
ally starts with a cross-country assessment 
of several indicators, such as the local gov-
ernments’ tax revenues and expenditures 
related to GDP, the share of tax revenues of 
local governments as a proportion of total 
tax revenue, and the significance of taxes 
for local governments’ revenues and for 
covering local expenditures. Table 1 com-
pares the share of local budgets in differ-
ent countries in 2018 (the data are sorted in 
descending order according to the share of 
local governments’ tax revenues as a pro-
portion of total tax revenue). 
The Scandinavian countries and Japan 
have the largest share of public expendi-
ture at the local level, whereas these figures 
are considerably lower in Hungary, Por-
tugal, Israel, and Greece. Countries with 
the largest share of local governments’ ex-
penditures are mostly those that have the 
highest percentage of tax revenues in their 
GDP. There are, however, some cases with 
differences between the share of expendi-
ture and tax receipts of local budgets. For 
example, the share of local tax revenue in 
Denmark and the Czech Republic is vir-
tually the same, but the latter has much 
higher local expenditure. Remarkably, lo-
cal tax revenues in Switzerland are higher 
than in Germany, while the situation is the 
opposite for local expenditures. 
Tax distribution and the number of 
local tasks determine the significance of 
tax revenues for local budgets. The share 
of non-tax revenues at the local level is 
comparatively small for most countries. 
Therefore, tax revenues of local govern-
ments have to be supplemented by trans-
fers, which play an important role in local 
budgets. 
The expenditures and revenues of local 
budgets in federal states are generally lo-
wer compared to unitary states. We can say 
that the data of unitary states corresponds 
better to the figures at sub-federal level that 
Journal of Tax Reform. 2020;6(1):73–89
75
ISSN 2412-8872
comprises regional (provincial, prefectural, 
etc.) and local budgets. The indicators de-
scribed above clearly show the difference 
between centralised and decentralised 
public finance systems. A decentralised 
system normally has a higher share of lo-
cal expenditures and tax revenues as well 
as a higher share of local governments’ tax 
revenues in total tax revenue. Taxes gene- 
rally play an important role in local govern-
ments’ receipts. Japan can serve as a model 
example of a decentralised local finance 
system with an important role played by 
local self-government. 
Compared to other countries, Japan 
has the largest share of tax revenues trans-
ferred to local governments, which signi-
fies a high level of commitment to their 
expenditures. What are the factors that 
shape the distribution of taxing powers 
among the governments of different levels 
in general, and local governments in par-
ticular? Which taxes are levied at the lo-
cal level? What are the implications of this 
model of local finance? Our study aims to 
address these questions by describing the 
mechanisms of inter-governmental redis-
tribution of tax revenues in Japan. 
Table 1
Local governments’ budgets in unitary and federal states in 2018
Country Local go-
vernment 
expendi-
tures, % 
GDP
Tax revenues 
of local  
governments, 
% GDP
Tax revenues 
of local 
governments, 
% of total tax 
revenue
Tax revenues 
of local govern-
ments, % of local 
governments’ 
revenues
Grants,  
% of local  
governments’ 
revenues
1. Unitary states – local level
Japan 14.7 7.5 38.6 45.4 40.4
Sweden 23.7 13.0 31.7 53.2 33.7
Finland 20.9 9.7 31.6 46.4 29.8
France 10.7 5.9 27.3 53.3 22.2
Denmark 33.4 12.1 27.0 36.1 57.6
Czech Republic 11.4 5.5 27.0 45.4 39.2
Republic of Korea 13.1 4.7 23.6 29.7 51.4
Poland 12.9 4.5 20.5 32.1 50.2
Norway 15.9 6.1 20.2 37.4 44.1
Italy 14.0 4.3 15.0 31.3 55.0
Portugal 5.9 2.5 10.2 43.0 31.8
Israel 5.5 2.4 9.6 41.5 41.4
Hungary 6.4 2.2 8.7 34.4 52.6
United Kingdom 9.2 1.7 6.0 17.9 63.9
Netherlands 13.0 1.3 5.5 10.5 72.1
Greece 3.5 0.9 3.4 23.6 63.4
2. Federal states – local level
Switzerland 7.0 4.3 20.3 60.7 10.8
Germany 8.3 3.3 13.6 38.5 39.3
Canada 8.3 3.3 11.6 38.4 44.2
Russia 6.8 1.2 5.7 16.3 75.7
Australia 1.9 1.0 3.4 38.7 13.7
3. Federal states – subfederal level
Canada 22.3 16.0 55.2 52.8 –
Switzerland 13.4 11.3 52.9 53.9 –
Germany 13.1 12.6 52.4 57.4 –
Russia 13.1 9.2 44.1 41.9 –
Australia 13.9 5.4 19.4 32.6 –
Note: the data for Republic of Korea are given as of 2017. 
Source: authors’ calculations according to International Monetary Fund. Government Finance Statistics 
Database. Available at: http://data.imf.org/?sk=a0867067-d23c-4ebc-ad23-d3b015045405.
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Our study starts with a brief overview 
of the history of local self-government in 
Japan. The historical section is followed 
by analysis of the relevant legal acts and 
empirical data, provided by the Statistics 
Bureau of Japan, Ministry of Finance of 
Japan, Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications (MIAC) of Japan, and 
the agencies this ministry comprises – the 
Local Public Finance Bureau and the Local 
Tax Bureau. 
2. Local government and its tax 
revenues in Japan  
in the XIX and XX centuries 
There is considerable research lit-
erature on the division of functions and 
sources of funding between different 
government levels in Japan. Although 
in this country institutions for self-go- 
vernance existed as far back as in the feu-
dal period (for more on this, see [1]), the 
Meiji era is widely considered to be the 
actual starting point for the development 
of the local government system [1–4]. 
Starting from 1871, there appeared a new 
administrative division system with pre-
fectures as the key territorial units [3]. By 
1888, the number of prefectures had been 
reduced significantly from more than 
300 to the present-day number of 47. In 
the same period, prefectures and munici-
palities (cities, towns and villages) were 
included into the hierarchy of local go-
vernments. 
The Meiji Constitution, which drew 
heavily on its Prussian counterpart, came 
in force in 1890. The Prussian Constitution 
presented a mixture of semi-feudalism 
and rigid bureaucracy, at the same time 
positioning the bourgeoisie as the key 
economic force. The Japanese elite were 
particularly taken with the Prussian con-
stitution, which they saw as ideological-
ly close [4]. Regulatory acts of the Meiji 
period were developed with the help of 
German specialists: Albert Mosse [5], 
a student of Lorenz von Stein and col-
league of Rudolf von Gneist, was invited 
to Japan as a legal expert to participate in 
drafting the law on local self-governance 
(for more on this, see [6]). The second half 
of the nineteenth century saw a flouri-
shing financial science in Prussia [7]. The 
Prussian public finance model adopted 
by Japan was highly centralized, which 
resulted in the appearance of the system 
where local governments had little au-
tonomy, the central government was in 
charge of tax administration, and local 
taxes were mostly stated as a percentage 
of national taxes. 
During the post-WWII American 
occupation of Japan, a range of politi-
cal, economic and social reforms were 
implemented, including reforms of the 
government system. The 1947 Consti-
tution of Japan was based on demo-
cratic principles and promoted local 
autonomy: in particular, it required 
that local officials such as mayors and 
governors should be elected by direct 
popular vote. 
In the late 1940s, a group headed by 
Prof. C.S. Shoup, a Columbia University 
economist and experienced taxation con-
sultant working for the U.S. Treasury De-
partment, were invited to Japan (for more 
on C.S. Shoup and the Shoup Mission in 
post-war Japan, see [8]). The aim of the 
Mission was to devise a system of taxation 
that would be contribute to faster restora-
tion of the economy and strengthening de-
mocracy in the country.
The Report on Japanese Taxation of 
the Shoup Mission published in 1949 de-
scribed the principles of the local taxation 
system [9]. Although the Report mostly 
dealt with budget revenues, it also men-
tioned the division of powers between 
different government levels which deter-
mined the revenue needs of governments. 
Among other things, the Report proposed 
a clear delineation of the functions of the 
three government levels, with specific 
tasks being assigned to each of those le-
vels. The priority was given to munici-
palities, then came the prefectures and 
the central government. The division of 
taxing powers was to follow several core 
principles [9]:
1. The tax system should be simple. 
The number of taxes should be reduced 
to a minimum and the taxation system 
should be transparent, understandable 
and convenient to taxpayers.
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2. Local governments should be able to 
administer local taxes efficiently. The tax 
base should be allocated to specific juris-
dictions. 
3. Tax sources should be divided be-
tween the national government, prefec-
tures and municipalities; governments 
on each level should have sufficient op-
portunities for efficient tax administra-
tion. Such division enables citizens to see 
the connection between the taxes they 
pay and the use of the corresponding tax 
revenues. 
4. Local authorities should have the 
powers to change the tax rates in accor-
dance with the needs and expectations of 
local inhabitants.
In order to provide more autonomy 
for local governments in post-war Ja-
pan, it was recommended to increase 
local revenues while simultaneously cut-
ting local expenditures, divide tax bases 
and introduce municipal taxes adminis-
tered on the local level. It was planned 
to increase the significance of local taxes 
while reducing the number of tax le- 
vies on the levels of prefectures and mu-
nicipalities. The list of local taxes was 
expected to include the property tax, 
inhabitant tax, and enterprise tax. The 
inhabitant and property taxes were rec-
ommended for the municipal level; the 
enterprise tax, food and beverage tax, for 
the prefectural level. 
The inhabitant tax introduced in the 
late 1940s combined the head tax and the 
tax that was calculated on the basis of the 
tax-paying capacity of citizens, primarily 
their income. The tax was levied both on 
the level of prefectures and municipali-
ties. Its rate was adjusted annually de-
pending on the fiscal needs. The Shoup 
Mission’s Report suggested that the in-
habitant tax should be levied on the in-
come declared by the taxpayer and that it 
should be applied only on the municipal 
level. It was expected that the tax reve-
nues would double as a result. 
The Report also suggested changes 
in the approaches to tax base estimation, 
which would lead to an increase in the 
significance of the local property tax. The 
existing tax was calculated on the basis of 
the annual rental value of the property tax, 
which led to the proliferation of tax eva-
sion schemes. The Report recommended 
to calculate the property tax by using the 
market value, which would increase mu-
nicipal tax revenues and enhance a more 
just distribution of tax burden in cities, 
towns and villages. 
The significance of the entertainment 
tax and the tax on food and beverages was 
explained by the connection between their 
tax bases and population density. For the 
local level it was recommended to use a 
VAT-like enterprise tax with the tax base 
defined as ‘total gross receipts minus all 
purchases from other firms, including 
purchase of capital equipment, land, and 
buildings’ [10]. 
To a considerable degree, the recom-
mendations of the Report were aimed at 
adapting the US federal taxation system 
for the needs of the Japanese unitary state. 
Some recommendations of the Report, in 
particular those concerning the local tax 
levied on value added, were innovative 
for that time [11].
The architecture of the tax system 
described in the Report was formally 
approved by the Japanese government. 
After the Report was published, Prime 
Minister Shigeru Yoshida announced 
that in order to build a rational and just 
system, it was necessary to follow pre-
cisely the recommendations of the Shoup 
Mission. The Minister of Finance Hayato 
Ikeda, however, expressed a more cau-
tious attitude: he believed that although 
theoretically the recommendations were 
correct, it would be difficult to imple-
ment them [12]. It was planned to realize 
the Mission’s recommendations in the 
middle term. 
The introduction of a new enterprise 
tax (i.e. the value-added tax) was post-
poned until 1953–1954 and eventually the 
Japanese government abandoned the idea 
altogether. The inhabitant and property 
tax were allocated to municipalities but, 
starting from 1954, they were also partial-
ly transferred to the level of prefectures 
[13]. Thus, not all recommendations of the 
Shoup Mission were realized in the Japa-
nese tax system.
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Table 2 illustrates the tax receipts of 
local governments in Japan and their sig-
nificance starting from the mid-twentieth 
century. The division of tax revenues, on 
the one hand, reflected the growing tax au-
tonomy of local authorities. On the other 
hand, the national tax revenues used as 
transfers to local governments were also 
growing in significance. Furthermore, the 
decentralization trends in the distribution 
of revenues went hand in hand with the 
centralization of certain functions.
The post-war system of public finance 
in Japan, combining elements of central-
ization and decentralization, which are 
usually seen as mutually exclusive, is best 
described by the term ‘controlled decen-
tralization’ proposed by K. Akizuki [2]. 
After the Great East Japan Earthquake 
of 2011, the importance of centralization 
became more evident. Even though the 
vast majority of studies in the sphere of 
state governance focus on the advantages 
of financial decentralization, it is some-
times impossible to effectively deal with 
the consequences of large-scale or even 
global natural disasters and pandemics on 
the local level. Such situations usually re-
quire financial decisions on the part of the 
national government. Since the 2010s, the 
liquidation of the consequences of the Fu-
kushima accident has been a major impe-
tus for centralization of the public finance 
in Japan (for more on this, see [15]).
Thus, the Japanese public finance sys-
tem is a unique case for research of cen-
tralization and local autonomy, since it 
comprises both of these trends. The Japa-
nese model of local public finance is dif-
ficult to compare with its counterparts in 
other countries. Studies of the state gov-
ernance in contemporary Germany and 
Japan [16] and of the way the Shoup Mis-
sion’s Report shaped Japan’s tax system 
[9] emphasize the differences between the 
present-day situation and the principles of 
fiscal federalism that the Report proposed. 
Current peculiarities of the Japanese local 
finance system stem from the combination 
of the European centralized model and the 
Anglo-American decentralized model, al-
though there are also some features that 
are unique to Japan. 
In the 1990s, Japan launched a pro-
found administrative and territorial re-
form, involving redistribution of powers 
between different levels of government1. 
The key provisions of the reform were 
described in the Comprehensive Decen-
1 For more on this, see: Situation in Lo-
cal Finances 2019, MIC of Japan. Available at: 
http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-
news/01zaisei07_02000205.html (In Japan.), as 
well as [17; 18].
Table 2
Local budgets’ tax revenues in Japan
Year Local budgets’ tax revenues 
in total tax revenues, %
Share of local budgets’ tax revenues 
(not taking into account financial 
equalization) in local budgets’ 
revenues, %
Before financial 
equalization
After financial 
equalization
1940 16 22 20.6
1950 30 44 34.6
1960 32 46 35.6
1970 32 49 35.4
1980 36 54 34.0
1990 35 53 41.6
2000 40 57 35.4
2010 44 67 39.6
2018 39 57 45.4
Note: In Japan, the fiscal year runs from 1 April until 31 March. Hereinafter, in our discussion of 
budgets in Japan, we will mean financial year and not calendar year when referring to a time period (for 
example, 2018 corresponds to the financial year from 01.04.2018 to 31.03.2019). 
Source: compiled by the authors from Financial Statistics of Japan. Available at: https://www.mof.
go.jp/english/pri/publication/financial_statistics_of_japan/index.htm (In Japan.); [14].
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tralisation Act, which was adopted in 
2000 and came into force in 2003. Mu-
nicipal mergers were a part of the reform 
resulting in a fall in the number of mu-
nicipalities from 3,229 in 1999 to 1,718 in 
2017. The main reasons behind this step 
were the unprecedented rates of popu-
lation ageing, changing fiscal needs, de-
creasing population density and other 
processes that required optimization on 
the municipal level2. 
In 2003, the beginning of the so-called 
‘triple reform’ of local budgets was an-
nounced. The reform included, first, cuts 
in state subsidies, second, reduction in 
the LAT grants, and, third, a shift of tax 
sources from the central government to lo-
cal governments. In the first three years of 
the reform (2003–2006), the sums of state 
subsidies and LAT grants were reduced in 
accordance with the plans. Nevertheless, 
since tax revenues came rather late to lo-
cal budgets, prefectures and municipali-
ties had to face a serious revenue short-
fall [19; 20]. In the following decade, the 
tax revenues started growing but only on 
the level of prefectures. In 2006–2016, the 
share of tax revenues in the prefectural 
budgets rose from 30.2 to 39.3%. On the 
municipal level, however, the picture was 
quite different: the share of local taxes 
declined from 34.4 to 32.7%. At the same 
time, state subsidies accounted for a larg-
er share of municipal revenues: there was 
an increase from 9.3 to 15.8%. As a result, 
prefectures became more autonomous in 
terms of revenues while cities, towns and 
villages, on the contrary, more dependent 
on the central government [21]. 
3. Tax assignment in Japan
Distribution of tax revenues in Japan 
is based on shared use of the tax base by 
the national and local governments and 
the relative autonomy of prefectures and 
municipalities in setting their tax rates 
within the limits of the national standard 
rates. Thus, C. Shoup’s main idea that each 
2 Local Autonomy in Japan. Current Situation 
& Future Shape. Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications of Japan; 2009. Available at: 
http://www.clair.or.jp/j/forum/other_data/
pdf/20100216_soumu_e.pdf
tax should be levied only on one govern-
ment level remained unrealized. Table 3 
shows tax revenues of budgets of different 
levels in Japan in 2018. 
Table 3
Allocation of tax revenues in Japan 
in 2018, bln yen
Taxes Central 
budget
Prefec-
tural 
budget
Mu-
nicipal 
budget
Individual 
income taxes
19420 4679 7674
Corporate 
income taxes
12820 5059 2301
Consumption 
taxes
17558 4707 –
Excise duties 8779 141 861
Property taxes – 1526 8943
Inheritance tax 2240 – –
Other taxes 2026 1581 2030
Source: authors’ calculations according to 
Financial Statistics of Japan. Available at: https://
www.mof.go.jp/english/pri/publication/finan-
cial_statistics_of_japan/index.htm (In Japan.).
Most revenues are provided by 
the personal income taxes, which include 
the national progressive income tax and 
inhabitant tax3. To be more precise, in Ja-
pan these taxes have the same name but 
different ways of collecting, determined 
on the level of prefectures and munici-
palities. The inhabitant tax is levied on 
individual citizens and on businesses and 
is, therefore, a tax on the population and 
local businesses of a specific prefecture 
or municipality. Individual citizens pay a 
fixed sum of 1,500 yen to the prefectural 
budgets and a fixed sum of 3,500 yen to 
municipal budgets plus income tax with 
the flat rate of 10% (4% for prefectures 
and 6% for municipalities) levied on the 
taxpayer’s income in the prior year. The 
tax base for the inhabitant tax is the same 
3 The names of taxes and instruments of 
revenue distribution in Japan usually reflect the 
economic rather than legal aspects of taxation. 
For example, the local corporation tax is a na-
tional tax and the word ‘local’ refers to the reason 
why it was introduced and its purpose. In fact, 
it was introduced to deal with the effects of the 
elimination of the prefectural tax that had been 
used before. The local allocation tax (LAT) is not 
a tax at all but a special kind of grant from the 
central budget to distribute some of the national 
tax revenues among the local budgets.
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as for the national income tax, although 
it does not take into account some allow-
ances, which means that the tax base of the 
inhabitant tax is somewhat broader than 
the tax base of the national tax. These rates 
and amounts of payments are set by the 
central government but can be adjusted by 
local authorities. The local inhabitant tax 
is paid on the source income and is trans-
ferred to the budgets of the prefecture/
municipality where the taxpayer resides 
by their withholding agents. 
For business taxation on the subcen-
tral level, several mandatory payments 
are used: the inhabitant tax (levied by pre-
fectures and municipalities) and prefec-
tural enterprise tax. The corporate inha-
bitant tax levied on businesses includes a 
fixed payment (its amount depends on the 
capital and staff number) and a payment 
calculated based on the national corpora-
tion tax by applying a progressive rate. All 
the components of the inhabitant tax are 
characterized by a heavier tax burden and 
larger taxing powers assigned to munici-
palities than to prefectures.
Prefectures gain revenues from the 
enterprise tax, which is levied at a com-
paratively low rate but has a wide range of 
tax bases: income, value added and capi-
tal. Small businesses are exempt from this 
tax. Since the 2010s, Japan has conducted 
a series of corporate tax reforms, which 
resulted in the elimination of the corre-
sponding local taxes. Since tax revenues 
were unevenly distributed [22], it was de-
cided to levy business taxes on the national 
level and transfer a part of these revenues 
to local governments in the form of grants.
The local consumption tax is a per-
centage included in the general consump-
tion tax rate in addition to the national tax. 
A general increase in the consumption 
rate affected prefectural budgets: until Oc-
tober 2019, the local tax rate had been 1.7% 
(the total tax rate 8%) and since October 
2019, the local tax rate rose to 2.2% (the to-
tal tax rate 10%) and 1.76% (of the reduced 
rate 8%). In setting the key parameters 
of the local consumption tax, prefectural 
governments have limited powers in com-
parison with other local taxes, where they 
enjoy greater autonomy. 
The municipal property tax is a levy 
on the market value of land and property. 
In the theory of local taxation, it is consid-
ered that the property tax is best levied on 
the municipal level since this tax provides 
stable receipts and can be effectively ad-
ministered by municipalities. A rise in the 
market value of land and property (the 
taxable value is revised every three years) 
leads to an increase in tax revenues. 
Experts have mixed views about the 
effectiveness of the shared use of indi-
vidual income, business profits and sales 
of goods by the central government, pre-
fectures and municipalities in Japan. On 
the one hand, shared tax base on differ-
ent levels of government works against 
the benefit principle of taxation (taxpay-
ers do not see the connection between the 
mandatory payments they make and the 
specific government level that receives 
these payments). Moreover, such situation 
detrimental to the sustainability of public 
finance during recession, since in this pe-
riod the two revenue sources may decline 
simultaneously [23]. On the other hand, if 
central and local governments share the 
same tax base, it helps cut administrative 
costs, prevents tax evasion (especially as 
far as indirect taxes are concerned), and fa-
cilitates tax reforms on the national level. 
There are several criteria for evalu-
ation of local taxes: evenness of distribu-
tion, stability and increasing revenue gen-
eration in response to economic growth. 
Viewed in the light of these criteria, the lo-
cal taxation system in Japan shows mixed 
results. On the one hand, the most evenly 
distributed across the country’s territory 
are the consumption tax (prefectures) 
and the property tax (municipalities). The 
individual inhabitant tax is also distrib-
uted quite evenly [22]. As far as the tax 
on local businesses and consumption tax 
are concerned, there is a certain balance 
between the stability of the tax revenues 
in the short term and the possibility of in-
crease in the tax revenues in the medium 
term period [24]. K. Ishida has analyzed 
the statistics on tax revenues of local go-
vernments in Japan from 1980 to 2017 
and showed that, despite the rise of land 
prices from the mid-1980s to the 2000s, the 
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system of municipal tax revenues was un-
stable while the revenues demonstrated 
low rates of growth [25]. T. Tran et al. in 
their analysis of the fiscal data of Tokyo 
Metropolitan Governments in 2010–2015 
found statistically significant positive as-
sociations between the volatility of most 
local taxes and expenditure volatility, but 
negative associations between the vola-
tility of grants and expenditure volatility 
[26]. Nevertheless, despite the problems 
faced by the Japanese local tax system, the 
country’s government are wary of initia-
ting reforms in this sphere and any adjust-
ments of this system are made only after 
prolonged consultations and assessment 
of their possible impact on different as-
pects of local finance. 
As for taxing powers, as it was shown 
above, the main elements of local taxes are 
determined on the national level while lo-
cal authorities have the right to set their 
own tax rates (adhering to the restrictions 
set on the national level) and change cer-
tain parameters of taxation. Municipalities 
have slightly broader taxing powers than 
prefectures. There is, however, no unified 
approach to setting tax rates across Japa-
nese territories. An increase in the local 
tax rate often leads to a reduction in the 
amount of financial support from other 
budgets [27; 28]. Nevertheless, many pre-
fectures and municipalities can set the 
rate of the local inhabitant tax as long as 
it does not exceed the standard tax rate 
[23]. Relatively high local tax rates can be 
explained by the fact that local authorities 
are not allowed to issue bonds if their tax 
rate is lower than the standard [29] while 
borrowing is a popular way used by local 
authorities in Japan to finance their ex-
penses. Local governments are allowed to 
set new taxes not specified by the national 
legislation, but such decisions need to be 
approved by the Ministry of Internal Af-
fairs and Communications. 
In 2018, local governments were allo-
cated a little bit less than 40% of total tax 
revenues. Since the mid-2000s, the share 
of national taxes has been growing due 
to the declining significance of municipal 
taxes (Fig. 1). 
The share of tax receipts going to mu-
nicipalities is larger than the share that 
goes to prefectures. Nevertheless, for a 
long time, the ratio of prefectural and mu-
nicipal expenditures and revenues has re-
mained virtually unchanged (Table 4). As 
a result of the decentralization reform in 
the early twenty-first century, the share of 
expenditures and revenues of municipali-
ties grew in comparison with prefectures. 
Municipalities fund a wide range of 
public services, including education, es-
pecially compulsory education (primary 
and secondary school), health care, city 
planning, fire services, housing and util-
ity services, and social services. Powers 
granted to municipalities by the central 
government vary depending on the type 
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of municipalities (mostly depends on the 
number of inhabitants)4. 
Table 4
Shares of prefectures and municipalities 
in total local budgets in Japan
Year Share in total 
revenues of local 
governments, %
Share in total ex-
penditures of local 
governments, %
Prefec-
tures
Munici-
palities
Prefec-
tures
Munici-
palities
1985 50 50 51 49
1990 50 50 51 49
1995 50 50 50 50
2000 50 50 50 50
2005 48 52 49 51
2006 49 51 49 51
2007 49 51 49 51
2014 47 53 47 53
2015 47 53 47 53
2016 47 53 47 53
Source: authors’ calculations according to 
Japan Statistical Yearbook 2020. Statistics Bureau, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
of Japan. Available at: https://www.stat.go.jp/
english/data/nenkan/69nenkan/index.html 
(In Japan.).
 
Prefectures act as a link between mu-
nicipalities and the central government. 
Services that extend beyond municipal ar-
eas are funded on the level of prefectures. 
The standards for these services are also 
set on the prefectural level. 
4. Prefectural and municipal tax 
revenues 
The key local tax in Japan which 
provides most revenues is the inhabit-
ant tax. In prefectures, this tax accounts 
for a third of tax receipts and in munici-
palities, for up to 45% (Table 5). Receipts 
from the inhabitant tax paid by individu-
als are larger than those paid by the cor-
porations. Nevertheless, if we consider 
the enterprise tax together with the tax on 
corporate inhabitants, it is easy to see that 
the amount of taxes paid by individuals 
and businesses to prefectural budgets is 
approximately the same. 
4 White Paper on Local Public Finance, 2019. 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of 
Japan. Available at: https://www.soumu.go.jp/
iken/zaisei/31data/chihouzaisei_2019_en.pdf 
(In Japan.)
Table 5
Structure of local budgets’ tax revenues 
in Japan in 2016
Tax 
reve-
nue, 
bln 
yen
Share 
in tax 
reve-
nues 
of local 
govern-
ments, 
%
Share in 
tax reve-
nues of 
prefec-
tures / 
munici-
palities, 
%
Local tax revenues, 
total
39392 100 –
1. Local prefectural 
taxes
18114 46 100
1.1. Prefectural in-
habitant tax 
5891 15 32.5
– paid by individuals 5017 12.7 27.7
– paid by corpora-
tions
874 2.2 4.8
1.2. Local government 
consumption tax
4703 11.9 26
1.3. Enterprise tax 4261 10.8 23.5
1.4. Motor vehicle 
tax
1535 3.9 8.5
1.5. Gas oil delivery 
tax
933 2.4 5.2
1.6. Real estate 
acquisition tax
397 1 2.2
1.7. Prefectural 
tobacco tax
149 0.4 0.8
1.8. Automobile 
acquisition tax
146 0.4 0.8
1.9. Other taxes 99 0.3 0.5
2. Local municipal 
taxes
21278 54 100
2.1. Municipal 
inhabitant tax 
9574 24.3 45
– paid by individuals 7365 18.7 34.6
– paid by corpora-
tions
2208 5.6 10.4
2.2. Property tax 8893 22.6 41.8
2.3. Light motor 
vehicle tax
238 0.6 1.1
2.4. City planning tax 1262 3.2 5.9
2.5. Municipal 
tobacco tax
911 2.3 4.3
2.6. Establishment 
tax
366 0.9 1.7
2.7. Bathing tax 22 0.1 0.1
2.8. Other taxes 12 0.03 0.1
Source: authors’ calculations according to 
Japan Statistical Yearbook 2020. Statistics Bureau, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
of Japan. Available at: https://www.stat.go.jp/
english/data/nenkan/69nenkan/index.html 
(In Japan.).
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The local consumption tax and enter-
prise tax rank second and third in terms of 
the amount of tax receipts to prefectural 
budgets. Figure 2 illustrates the consoli-
dated structure of the main taxes as sourc-
es of prefectures’ revenues since the early 
2000s. In the 2000s, the enterprise tax ac-
counted for about a third of tax revenues 
of prefectures but since 2009 its share has 
been steadily declining as a result of the 
introduction of the LAT. The LAT is set at 
a given percentage of the major national 
taxes and distributed in the form of grants 
to local governments. The fall in enter-
prise tax revenues is compensated by the 
growing role of the inhabitant tax and lo-
cal consumption tax. Since 2016, the main 
sources of tax revenues of prefectures 
have retained a similar proportion. 
The motor vehicle tax, which has ac-
counted for 8–12% of the total tax reve-
nues of prefectures since the mid-2000s, 
is levied as a fixed amount depending 
on the engine size and how the vehicle is 
used (personal or business use). The mo-
tor vehicle tax is based both on vehicle 
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Available at: https://www.mof.go.jp/english/pri/publication/financial_statistics_of_japan/index.htm (In Japan.)
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ownership and usage of roads. Since 2010, 
the motor vehicle tax revenues have been 
declining both in absolute values and in 
terms of total tax revenues of prefectures. 
Municipal tax revenues come from 
the inhabitant tax and property tax. Until 
2006, receipts from the property tax had 
exceeded those from the income tax but 
starting from the second half of the 2000s, 
the situation changed to the opposite. Re-
ceipts from the property tax are more sta-
ble and their year-to-year variation does 
not exceed 2–4%. 
About 7–8% of municipal tax revenues 
come from special purpose taxes (hunting 
tax, city planning tax, onsen (bathing) tax) 
but the fiscal significance of each of these 
taxes is comparatively low. As far as spe-
cial purpose taxes are concerned, local au-
thorities enjoy the most autonomy: they 
have the right to set local taxes to address 
the needs of their respective territories. 
Tax revenues of prefectures and mu-
nicipalities are in general quite balanced: 
revenues of prefectures come from three 
main sources and those of municipalities, 
from two. Local taxes are levied on busi-
nesses and individuals and the taxation 
base comprises income, revenue, property 
and consumption.
Receipts from local taxes are more 
evenly distributed among prefectures 
than municipalities (Table 6), which can 
be explained by the significance of tax rev-
enues in the capital’s budgets: 79% of lo-
cal expenditures of Tokyo Metropolis are 
covered by the receipts from local taxes. 
If we compare budgets of municipali-
ties and prefectures, including Tokyo, we 
will see that the average significance of lo-
cal taxes for covering expenditures will be 
the same – 30%. A smaller share of tax re-
ceipts in the expenditures of local budgets 
in comparison with revenues is explained 
by the fact that a considerable part of ex-
penditures is covered by the bonds issued 
by local authorities. This figure, however, 
varies across prefectures more signifi-
cantly than across municipalities. Since 
tax revenues are not equally distributed 
among the territories, it becomes neces-
sary to provide regular grants to local 
governments for fiscal equalization. 
Table 6
Share of revenue sources in local 
budgets in 2016
Indicator Share in local budget 
expenditures, %
Local 
taxes
LAT Local 
bonds
1. Prefectural budgets (including Tokyo)
Maximum value 79 40 18
Minimum value 13 0 2
Mean value 32 24 13
Standard deviation 13 10 3
Covariance 42 39 24
2. Prefectural budgets (excluding Tokyo)
Maximum value 62 40 18
Minimum value 13 4 5
Mean value 30 25 13
Standard deviation 11 9 3
Covariance 37 36 20
3. Municipal budgets
Maximum value 50 34 14
Minimum value 16 1 3
Mean value 30 19 9
Standard deviation 9 8 2
Covariance 29 43 21
Source: authors’ calculations according to 
Japan Statistical Yearbook 2020. Statistics Bureau, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
of Japan. Available at: https://www.stat.go.jp/
english/data/nenkan/69nenkan/index.html 
(In Japan.).
5. Redistribution of national tax 
receipts as grants to local governments
Even though the revenue base of lo-
cal governments is considered quite ba-
lanced, a considerable part of the taxes is 
levied on the central level and then trans-
ferred to prefectures and municipalities in 
the form of financial assistance (grants). 
Grants are usually distinguished from tax 
revenue. But as most countries rely on tax-
es for the central government’s revenues, 
transfers from higher level budgets are 
in fact also tax revenues; these revenues 
are for the most part independent of the 
territories that receive them. Although in 
many countries these considerations are 
of theoretical rather than practical nature, 
the Japanese system of local governments’ 
revenues reveals the connection between 
grants from the central budget and the tax 
revenues of this budget. 
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The local allocation tax (LAT) is paid 
annually to the budgets of prefectures and 
municipalities to adjust the fiscal imba-
lance among local governments. Despite 
its name, the LAT is actually a transfer of 
a fixed sum from the central to the local 
budget. In 2017, this sum included 33.1% 
of the income tax and corporate tax reve-
nues, 50% of the alcohol tax and 22.3% of 
the consumption tax5. Thus, local govern-
5 White Paper on Local Public Finance, 2019. 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 
of Japan. Available at: https://www.soumu.
go.jp/iken/zaisei/31data/chihouzaisei_2019_
en.pdf (In Japan.)
ments are provided with the basic level of 
revenues to maintain the level of public 
services according to the unified national 
standards. As a result, the revenues of lo-
cal budgets are more or less equal regard-
less of the territories’ population size. 
Figures 4 and 5 show tax revenues 
and financial assistance per capita from 
the central budget to prefectural and mu-
nicipal budgets in the ascending order. 
Figures 4 and 5 demonstrate the re-
sults of fiscal equalization per capita. The 
biggest imbalance in terms of local tax rev-
enues is characteristic of prefectural bud-
gets (the ratio of the standard deviation to 
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the mean value per capita was 34% in 
2016). After fiscal equalization, the corre-
sponding per capita indicator, which takes 
into account local tax revenues, national 
tax revenues transferred to local govern-
ments and the LAT, was 23% for prefec-
tures and 18% for local budgets in total. 
Even though the LAT is more signifi-
cant for prefectures than for municipali-
ties (Table 6), the biggest differences in the 
share of expenditures covered from this 
source are characteristic of municipalities. 
This can be explained by the uneven dis-
tribution of revenues among cities, towns 
and villages. 
In 15 prefectures, the LAT covered 
from 30 to 40% of local expenditures; in 
14, from 10 to 20%. The budget of Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government does not rely 
on LAT grants. The share of the LAT in 
the expenditures of consolidated munici-
pal budgets within one prefecture exceed-
ed 30% only in three prefectures, while in 
24 prefectures, it was less than 20%. These 
figures point to the fact that on average, in 
comparison with prefectures, in munici-
palities the LAT covers a smaller share of 
expenditures.
Table 7
National tax revenues transferred 
to local budgets in Japan
Year Share of 
the LAT in 
national 
tax reve-
nues, %
Share of local tax revenues 
and tax revenues trans-
ferred to local budgets in 
total tax revenues (taking 
into account fiscal  
equalization), %
2006 31.2 63.5
2007 28.9 60.5
2008 32.1 64.0
2009 33.1 63.7
2010 38.7 67.3
2011 38.5 67.4
2012 37.1 66.1
2013 34.5 64.0
2014 31.5 61.6
2015 27.9 58.4
2016 28.3 59.2
2017 26.6 57.6
2018 25.5 56.7
Source: authors’ calculations according to 
Financial Statistics of Japan. Available at: https://
www.mof.go.jp/english/pri/publication/finan-
cial_statistics_of_japan/index.htm (In Japan.).
In 2008–2013, local governments re-
ceived about a third of national tax reve-
nues through LAT, and in 2018, a fourth. 
Table 1 showed that in comparison with 
other countries, Japan has the largest 
share of tax revenues going to local bud-
gets. However, if we also take into account 
those tax revenues that are transferred to 
local governments as financial assistance, 
the distribution of tax revenues in Japan 
will appear even more decentralized: in 
the first half of the 2010s, the revenues of 
prefectures and municipalities exceeded 
60% of the country’s total tax revenue and 
in 2018, 56.7% (Table 7). 
In addition, it should be noted that 
one more important source of revenues 
for prefectures and municipalities is local 
bonds. 
6. Conclusions 
The system of tax revenues of local 
governments in Japan has several salient 
characteristics related to a complex con-
figuration of centralisation and decentral-
isation, which have taken different forms 
at different stages of historical develop-
ment. In the second half of the twentieth 
century, the fiscal aspects of local gover-
nance underwent serious transformation. 
Specific functions were assigned to dif-
ferent levels of government, tax sources 
were allocated to local budgets, and the 
decentralised system of public finance 
was established. These arrangements, 
however, did not eliminate centralisation, 
since they also included instruments of 
administrative control over local authori-
ties. In the post-war period, the expendi-
tures and revenue figures for prefectures 
and municipalities were quite similar. 
In the early twenty-first century, after a 
round of municipal mergers, the share 
of municipalities’ expenditures and rev-
enues grew in comparison to prefectures. 
Eventually, Japan became a country with 
the largest share of tax revenues trans-
ferred to local governments, compared to 
other unitary states. 
The financial endowments of local au-
thorities in Japan are equalised through 
annual payments in the form of the LAT 
to local governments. The LAT comprises 
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approximately a fourth of prefectural and 
a fifth of municipal revenues. Such design 
of financial equalisation, combined with 
the active use of borrowing, explains why 
other grants play a comparatively small 
role in local tax revenues. This fact can 
also be regarded as an indirect evidence of 
the relative stability of local tax revenues 
in Japan. 
In the early 2000s, the system of pub-
lic finance faced serious challenges, such 
as slow economic growth, population de-
cline and ageing, concentration of people 
in several large cities, and the outflow of 
population from most provincial territo-
ries. The results were a growing budget 
deficit and the shrinking capacity of the 
central government to subsidise local 
budgets. This situation led the govern-
ment to rebuild the mechanism of bud-
geting, both at the national and local 
levels. The reform of inter-governmental 
fiscal relations that was finalised in 2003 
addressed these problems by cutting 
central subsidies, reducing the amount 
of revenue redistribution, and enhanc-
ing the financial capacity of local go-
vernments. The goals of the reforms were 
achieved only at the level of prefectures 
while municipalities became even more 
dependent on national grants. Therefore, 
municipalities have had considerably 
fewer opportunities for strengthening 
their governing capacity and becoming 
more self-sufficient than prefectures. This 
implies that different approaches are ne-
cessary to reforming municipal and pre-
fectural budget systems. 
The natural disasters that hit Japan in 
the 2010s highlighted the need to preserve 
the centrally-controlled elements in the 
country’s system of public finance. The 
choices that Japan made in the aftermath 
of these disasters regarding centralisation 
and decentralisation of state governance 
will affect, in all likelihood, the policies of 
other countries when faced with the threat 
of a global pandemic. 
In Japan, the central and local go-
vernments share tax bases. The taxing 
powers of local governments are limited 
by the standard tax rates set at the na-
tional level. Such division of tax sources 
creates vulnerabilities in periods of eco-
nomic instability but helps in facilitating 
tax administration. Since the beginning 
of the 2010s, as part of tax reforms, some 
business taxes have been transferred 
from the local to national level due to 
the unequal distribution of the tax base 
across provinces. 
For prefectures, the main sources of 
revenues are the inhabitant tax, local con-
sumption tax, and enterprise tax. These 
taxes usually have the same significance 
for prefectural budgets. For municipali-
ties, the primary sources are the local 
inhabitant tax and property tax. Tax re-
venues of prefectures are generally lower 
than those of municipal governments. Al-
though local tax revenues have a similar 
average significance for prefectural and 
municipal budgets, prefectures have more 
substantial differences in terms of local tax 
revenues. 
Financial assistance to local govern-
ments is mostly channelled through the 
LAT, which is a transfer of a fixed amount 
of national tax revenue to the budgets of 
prefectures and municipalities. The LAT 
provides effective equalisation of local 
revenues per capita and is more impor-
tant for prefectures than for municipali-
ties. Taking into account LAT payments, 
subnational budgets in Japan received 
about 60% of total tax revenues in the 
first half of the 2010s, with the reduction 
of this share in more recent years. In ad-
dition, prefectures and municipalities 
covered about 10% of their expenditures 
by issuing local bonds.
Even a limited endorsement of the 
Japanese tax system is hardly feasible in 
different national settings. At the same 
time, the experience of Japan is worth 
consideration, especially regarding the 
revenue base of local governments. An 
interesting subject is the set of limitations 
of local taxing powers by the national 
government, while another remarkable 
trend is that of municipal mergers aimed 
at ensuring a balanced regional develop-
ment and equalising the distribution of 
tax revenues. The analysis of these matters 
can help show the theoretical and practi-
cal relevance of our study.
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